Enemies to the east? http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=173878

Thursday, April 23, 2009 Kamila Hyat The writer is a freelance columnist and former newspaper editor Two stuffed camels, as tall and as dour as the actual beasts, stand these days along the Lahore canal. Atop them ride two figures – dressed from head-to-toe in stark white robes and obviously meant to represent desert Arabs. The camels seem oddly out of place amidst the colourful floats and other, sometimes garish, displays of dancers and peacocks and boats and horses meant to mark the city's Spring Festival. One asks how they came to stand there or what role they have amongst the 'dhol' carrying figures from a Punjabi village or the colourfully dressed women who churn their pots of 'lassi'. But the presence of the Arabs represents something of the confusion that has overtaken us. Since the 1980s, a forceful attempt has been made to turn heads to the west, to place Pakistan in the Muslim Middle East and to have it abandon its place amidst the more diverse whole of South Asia. It is this thinking of course that has led to the absurd -- but widely held notion that the history of Pakistan begins with the landing in Sindh of Muhammad Bin Qasim in 711 A.D. Today, the mindset that inspired this twist on history seems active again. There is talk of India, rather than the Taliban, being the 'real' enemy. This view is echoed frequently in the media. This of course is no big surprise given that the media has, indeed, traditionally leaned largely to the right. But more alarming is the fact that within Pakistan's military there is a clear opinion that while the civilian government may see militants as the enemies, the real foe is India. An effort to persuade at least selected politicians of this, and thus create a divide in the setup, is now on. To make this process still more effective, the whole war being fought in Pakistan is depicted as one between the US and the Taliban. The fact that over 300 Pakistani civilians have died this year in suicide bombings carried out by the militants is cleverly ignored. And attempts have been made – some media insiders believe almost certainly orchestrated by intelligence agencies – to discredit video footage of the flogging of a girl in Swat by painting it as a NGO conspiracy. No rational, no logic has been put forward as to the hows and whys of this. The entire chain of reasoning that holds the war against the militants is the USA's rather than ours, and that it is India whom we should be fighting, must be challenged. Our politicians need to come out unequivocally to question this flawed line of thought. Whereas it is true that much of the militancy we confront today is a consequence of US policies and the continued presence of that country's troops in Afghanistan, we must keep in mind that the situation is not that of 'either the US or the Taliban'. It is possible to have two enemies; it is sensible in such a situation to decide how strategically to take them both on, possibly one at a time. But simply because there is so much to oppose as far as Washington goes does not mean we should place ourselves in the camp of the blood-thirsty militants who think nothing of gunning down people and then impaling their heads upon poles. So far, even if reluctantly, the military has been following political orders to take on the militants. It has not had much success. This embarrassment seems to be one factor in its decision that it may be better to join an enemy one cannot beat. Faced with a military that it believes is not fully under its command, the political setup too has shown signs of wavering. In parliament last week, with one honourable exception, no one seemed willing to question the peace deal in Swat. This included the 'liberals' and the women in the National Assembly. Perhaps the fear of Taliban bullets was a factor in their silence; perhaps it was an obligation to toe the line of their parties. But whatever the reasons our politicians showed themselves both unwilling and incapable of defending the right of people who live under the ruthless rule of the Taliban. There is another problem. While there are politicians who have no sympathy with the Taliban, they ask how this force is to be battled without the full support of the military. There are no easy answers. But a start has to be made somewhere. One place to do so is by encouraging people to gaze once more to the east and to re-establish Pakistan as a South Asian nation, an inheritor of its unique blend of cultures, rather than as a country that equates itself only with that portion of the past that belongs to Islam. To do this, the fallacy that we can militarily take on India – perhaps because we have nuclear weapons – must be exposed as nothing more than a lie. An army that has been unable to tame a few thousand maverick militants can hardly be expected to take on a far larger and more organized army. There are also other hard realities that must be confronted. Much as we may wish to deny it, much as stories of Indian 'failure' are lapped up by our media, the real, unquestionable fact is that that country has succeeded. Its 1.2 billion people, despite a slowdown that has crippled many segments of the Indian economy, look to the future with hope. Pakistan's 160 million see less and less light to brighten the darkness that swirls all around and threatens to overwhelm them. Think tanks hold India will, by 2020, rank as a world super power. They ask if Pakistan can till then even hold together as a cohesive state. Some Pentagon analysts have envisaged a situation where it breaks up into separate fiefdoms, controlled by Taliban warlords. This is not impossible to envisage given that control of Swat has already been handed over to Maulana Fazalullah and Sufi Mohammad Khan. Some of the scenarios being drawn up may be far-fetched. Many drafts for the future drawn up by American or European think tanks have of course proved inaccurate. Among these was the notion that Pakistan would evolve into a stable, developed country. This has not happened. The country's president has warned the world that terrorists based in Pakistan threaten everyone. He has not said how this threat is to be tackled. But answers have to be found. The only option for Pakistan is to break free of the militant grip, focus on building a new relationship with India and realize the only hope for a brighter future lies in building regional harmony rather than in waging war.

December 8, 2008

Op-Ed Contributor

They Hate Us — and India Is Us

By PATRICK FRENCH

London

AS an open, diverse and at times chaotic democracy, India has long been a target for terrorism. From the assassination of Mohandas Gandhi in 1948 to the recent attacks in Mumbai, it has faced attempts to change its national character by force. None has yet succeeded. Despite its manifest social failings, India remains the developing world’s most successful experiment in free, plural, large-scale political collaboration.

The Mumbai attacks were transformative, because in them, unlike previous outrages in India, the rich were caught: not only Western visitors in the nation’s magnificent financial capital but also Indian bankers, business owners and socialites. This had symbolic power, as the terrorists knew it would.

However, I recently saw a televised forum in which members of the public vented their fury against India’s politicians for their failure to act, and it soon became apparent the victims were poor as well as rich. One survivor, Shameem Khan — instantly identifiable by his name and his embroidered cap as a Muslim — told how six members of his extended family had been shot dead. Still in shock, he said: “A calamity has fallen on my house. What shall I do?” His neighbors had helped pay for the funeral. Like most of India’s 150 million Muslims, Mr. Khan is staunchly patriotic. The city’s Muslim Council refused to let the terrorists be buried in its graveyards.

When these well-planned attacks unfolded, it was clear to anyone with experience of India that they were not homegrown, and almost certainly originated from Pakistan. Yet the reaction of the world’s news media was to rely on the outmoded idea of Pakistan-India hyphenation — as if a thriving and prosperous democracy of over a billion people must be compared only to an imploded state that is having to be bailed out by the I.M.F. Was Pakistan to blame, asked many pundits, or was India at fault because of its treatment of minority groups?

The terrorists themselves offered little explanation, and made no clear demands. Yet even as the siege continued, commentators were making chilling deductions on their behalf: their actions were because of American foreign policy, or Afghanistan, or the harassment of Indian Muslims. Personal moral responsibility was removed from the players in the atrocity. When officials said that the killers came from the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, it was taken as proof that India’s misdeeds in the Kashmir Valley were the cause.

These misdeeds are real, as are India’s other social and political failings (I recently met a Kashmiri man whose father and sister had died at the hands of the Indian security forces). But there is no sane reason to think Lashkar-e-Taiba would shut down if the situation in Kashmir improved. Its literature is much concerned with establishing a caliphate in Central Asia, and murdering those who insult the Prophet. Its leader, Hafiz Saeed, who lives on a large estate outside Lahore bought with Saudi Money, goes about his business with minimal interference from the Pakistani government.

Lashkar-e-Taiba is part of the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (the Qaeda franchise). Mr. Saeed’s hatreds are catholic — his bugbears include Hindus, Shiites and women who wear bikinis. He regards democracy as “a Jewish and Christian import from Europe,” and considers suicide attacks to be in accordance with Islam. He has a wider strategy: “At this time our contest is Kashmir. Let’s see when the time comes. Our struggle with the Jews is always there.” As he told his followers in Karachi at a rally in 2000: “There can’t be any peace while India remains intact. Cut them, cut them — cut them so much that they kneel before you and ask for mercy.” In short, he has an explicit political desire to create a state of war between the religious communities in India and beyond, and bring on the endgame.

Like other exponents of Islamist extremism, he has a view of the world that does not tolerate doubt or ambiguity: his opponents are guilty, and must be killed. I have met other radicals like Mr. Saeed, men who live in a dimension of absolute certainty and have contempt for the moral relativism of those who seek to excuse them. To achieve their ends, it is necessary to indoctrinate boys in the hatred of Hindus, Americans and Jews, and dispatch them on suicide missions. It is unlikely that any of the militants who were sent from Karachi to Mumbai — young men from poor rural backgrounds whose families were paid for their sacrifice — had ever met a Jew before they tortured and killed Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg and his wife, Rivka, who was several months pregnant, at the Mumbai Jewish center.

America’s so-called war on terror has been, in many respects, a catastrophe. In Pakistan, it has been chronically mishandled, leading to the radicalization of areas in the north that were previously peaceful. Yet links between the military, the intelligence services and the jihadis have remained intact: Lashkar-e-Taiba is merely one of a number of extremist organizations that continues to function.

The prime solution to the present crisis is to force the closing of terrorist training outfits in Pakistan, and apply the law to those who organize and finance operations like the Mumbai massacres. Hafiz Saeed and other suspects should be sent to India to stand trial. The remark by Pakistan’s president, Asif Ali Zardari (a man whose history of shady business dealing makes him demonstrably unfit for high, or even low, office), that he did not think the terrorists came from Pakistanwould be funny if it were not tragic.

The United States gives around $1 billion a year in military aid to Islamabad; that is leverage. It does the people of Pakistan no favors for Washington to allow their leaders to continue with the strategy of perpetual diversion, asking India to be patient while denying the true nature of the immediate terrorist threat. I received this e-mail message recently from a friend in Karachi: “Nowhere can get more depressing than Pakistan these days — barring some African failed states and Afghanistan.”

Patrick French is the author, most recently, of “The World Is What It Is: The Authorized Biography of V. S. Naipaul.”

Next Steps in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

December 8, 2008 | 1923 GMT

By George Friedman

Related Special Topic Page

• Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences

In an interview published this Sunday in The New York Times, we laid out a potential scenario for the current Indo-Pakistani crisis. We began with an Indian strike on Pakistan, precipitating a withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Afghan border, resulting in intensified Taliban activity along the border and a deterioration in the U.S. position in Afghanistan, all culminating in an emboldened Iran. The scenario is not unlikely, assuming India chooses to strike.

Our argument that India is likely to strike focused, among other points, on the weakness of the current Indian government and how it is likely to fall under pressure from the opposition and the public if it does not act decisively. An unnamed Turkish diplomat involved in trying to mediate the dispute has argued that saving a government is not a good reason to go to war. That is a good argument, except that in this case, not saving the government is unlikely to prevent a war, either.

If India’s Congress party government were to fall, its replacement would be even more likely to strike at Pakistan. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Congress’ Hindu nationalist rival, has long charged that Congress is insufficiently aggressive in combating terrorism. The BJP will argue that the Mumbai attack in part resulted from this failing. Therefore, if the Congress government does not strike, and is subsequently forced out or loses India’s upcoming elections, the new government is even more likely to strike.

It is therefore difficult to see a path that avoids Indian retaliation, and thus the emergence of at least a variation on the scenario we laid out. But the problem is not simply political: India must also do something to prevent more Mumbais. This is an issue of Indian national security, and the pressure on India’s government to do something comes from several directions.

Three Indian Views of Pakistan

The question is what an Indian strike against Pakistan, beyond placating domestic public opinion, would achieve. There are three views on this in India.

The first view holds that Pakistani officials aid and abet terrorism — in particular the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), which serves as Pakistan’s main intelligence service. In this view, the terrorist attacks are the work of Pakistani government officials — perhaps not all of the government, but enough officials of sufficient power that the rest of the government cannot block them, and therefore the entire Pakistani government can be held accountable.

The second view holds that terrorist attacks are being carried out by Kashmiri groups that have long been fostered by the ISI but have grown increasingly autonomous since 2002 — and that the Pakistani government has deliberately failed to suppress anti-Indian operations by these groups. In this view, the ISI and related groups are either aware of these activities or willfully ignorant of them, even if ISI is not in direct control. Under this thinking, the ISI and the Pakistanis are responsible by omission, if not by commission.

The third view holds that the Pakistani government is so fragmented and weak that it has essentially lost control of Pakistan to the extent that it cannot suppress these anti-Indian groups. This view says that the army has lost control of the situation to the point where many from within the military-intelligence establishment are running rogue operations, and groups in various parts of the country simply do what they want. If this argument is pushed to its logical conclusion, Pakistan should be regarded as a state on the verge of failure, and an attack by India might precipitate further weakening, freeing radical Islamist groups from what little control there is.

The first two analyses are essentially the same. They posit that Pakistan could stop attacks on India, but chooses not to. The third is the tricky one. It rests on the premise that the Pakistani government (and in this we include the Pakistani army) is placing some restraint on the attackers. Thus, the government’s collapse would make enough difference that India should restrain itself, especially as any Indian attack would so destabilize Pakistan that it would unleash our scenario and worse. In this view, Pakistan’s civilian government has only as much power in these matters as the army is willing to allow.

The argument against attacking Pakistan therefore rests on a very thin layer of analysis. It requires the belief that Pakistan is not responsible for the attacks, that it is nonetheless restraining radical Islamists to some degree, and that an Indian attack would cause even these modest restraints to disappear. Further, it assumes that these restraints, while modest, are substantial enough to make a difference.

There is a debate in India, and in Washington, as to whether this is the case. This is why New Delhi has demanded that Pakistan turn over 20 individuals wanted by India in connection with attacks. The list doesn’t merely include Islamists, but also Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, the former head of the ISI who has long been suspected of close ties with Islamists. (The United States apparently added Gul to the list.) Turning those individuals over would be enormously difficult politically for Pakistan. It would create a direct confrontation between Pakistan’s government and the Pakistani Islamist movement, likely sparking violence in Pakistan. Indeed, turning any Pakistani over to India, regardless of ideology, would create a massive crisis in Pakistan.

The Indian government chose to make this demand precisely because complying with it is enormously difficult for Pakistan. New Delhi is not so much demanding the 20 individuals, but rather that Pakistan take steps that will create conflict in Pakistan. If the Pakistani government is in control of the country, it should be able to weather the storm. If it can’t weather the storm, then the government is not in control of Pakistan. And if it could weather the storm but chooses not to incur the costs, then India can reasonably claim that Pakistan is prepared to export terrorism rather than endure it at home. In either event, the demand reveals things about the Pakistani reality.

The View from Islamabad

Pakistan’s evaluation, of course, is different. Islamabad does not regard itself as failed because it cannot control all radical Islamists or the Taliban. The official explanation is that the Pakistanis are doing the best they can. From the Pakistani point of view, while the Islamists ultimately might represent a threat, the threat to Pakistan and its government that would arise from a direct assault on the Islamists is a great danger not only to Pakistan, but also to the region. It is thus better for all to let the matter rest. The Islamist issue aside, Pakistan sees itself as continuing to govern the country effectively, albeit with substantial social and economic problems (as one might expect). The costs of confronting the Islamists, relative to the benefits, are therefore high.

The Pakistanis see themselves as having several effective counters against an Indian attack. The most important of these is the United States. The very first thing Islamabad said after the Mumbai attack was that a buildup of Indian forces along the Pakistani border would force Pakistan to withdraw 100,000 troops from its Afghan border. Events over the weekend, such as the attack on a NATO convoy, showed the vulnerability of NATO’s supply line across Pakistan to Afghanistan.

The Americans are fighting a difficult holding action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States needs the militant base camps in Pakistan and the militants’ lines of supply cut off, but the Americans lack the force to do this themselves. A withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the Afghan border would pose a direct threat to American forces. Therefore, the Pakistanis expect Washington to intervene on their behalf to prevent an Indian attack. They do not believe a major Indian troop buildup will take place, and if it does, the Pakistanis do not think it will lead to substantial conflict.

There has been some talk of an Indian naval blockade against Pakistan, blocking the approaches to Pakistan’s main port of Karachi. This is an attractive strategy for India, as it plays to New Delhi’s relative naval strength. Again, the Pakistanis do not believe the Indians will do this, given that it would cut off the flow of supplies to American troops in Afghanistan. (Karachi is the main port serving U.S. forces in Afghanistan.) The line of supply in Afghanistan runs through Pakistan, and the Americans, the Pakistanis calculate, do not want anything to threaten that.

From the Pakistani point of view, the only potential military action India could take that would not meet U.S. opposition would be airstrikes. There has been talk that the Indians might launch airstrikes against Islamist training camps and bases in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. In Pakistan’s view, this is not a serious problem. Mounting airstrikes against training camps is harder than it might seem. The only way to achieve anything in such a facility is with area destruction weapons — for instance, using B-52s to drop ordnance over very large areas. The targets are not amenable to strike aircraft, because the payload of such aircraft is too small. It would be tough for the Indians, who don’t have strategic bombers, to hit very much. Numerous camps exist, and the Islamists can afford to lose some. As an attack, it would be more symbolic than effective.

Moreover, if the Indians did kill large numbers of radical Islamists, this would hardly pose a problem to the Pakistani government. It might even solve some of Islamabad’s problems, depending on which analysis you accept. Airstrikes would generate massive support among Pakistanis for their government so long as Islamabad remained defiant of India. Pakistan thus might even welcome Indian airstrikes against Islamist training camps.

Islamabad also views the crisis with India with an eye to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. Any attack by India that might destabilize the Pakistani government opens at least the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear strike or, in the event of state disintegration, of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of factional elements. If India presses too hard, New Delhi faces the unknown of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal — unless, of course, the Indians are preparing a pre-emptive nuclear attack on Pakistan, something the Pakistanis find unlikely.

All of this, of course, depends upon two unknowns. First, what is the current status of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? Is it sufficiently reliable for Pakistan to count on? Second, to what extent do the Americans monitor Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities? Ever since the crisis of 2002, when American fears that Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall into al Qaeda’s hands were high, we have assumed that American calm about Pakistan’s nuclear facilities was based on Washington’s having achieved a level of transparency on their status. This might limit Pakistan’s freedom of action with regard to — and hence ability to rely on — its nuclear arsenal.

Notably, much of Pakistan’s analysis of the situation rests on a core assumption — namely, that the United States will choose to limit Indian options, and just as important, that the Indians would listen to Washington. India does not have the same relationship or dependence on the United States as, for example, Israel does. India historically was allied with the Soviet Union; New Delhi moved into a strategic relationship with the United States only in recent years. There is a commonality of interest between India and the United States, but not a dependency. India would not necessarily be blocked from action simply because the Americans didn’t want it to act.

As for the Americans, Pakistan’s assumption that the United States would want to limit India is unclear. Islamabad’s threat to shift 100,000 troops from the Afghan border will not easily be carried out. Pakistan’s logistical capabilities are limited. Moreover, the American objection to Pakistan’s position is that the vast majority of these troops are not engaged in controlling the border anyway, but are actually carefully staying out of the battle. Given that the Americans feel that the Pakistanis are ineffective in controlling the Afghan-Pakistani border, the shift from virtually to utterly ineffective might not constitute a serious deterioration from the United States’ point of view. Indeed, it might open the door for more aggressive operations on — and over — the Afghan-Pakistani border by American forces, perhaps by troops rapidly transferred from Iraq.

The situation of the port of Karachi is more serious, both in the ground and naval scenarios. The United States needs Karachi; it is not in a position to seize the port and the road system out of Karachi. That is a new war the United States can’t fight. At the same time, the United States has been shifting some of its logistical dependency from Pakistan to Central Asia. But this requires a degree of Russian support, which would cost Washington dearly and take time to activate. In short, India’s closing the port of Karachi by blockade, or Pakistan’s doing so as retaliation for Indian action, would hurt the United States badly.

Supply lines aside, Islamabad should not assume that the United States is eager to ensure that the Pakistani state survives. Pakistan also should not assume that the United States is impressed by the absence or presence of Pakistani troops on the Afghan border. Washington has developed severe doubts about Pakistan’s commitment and effectiveness in the Afghan-Pakistani border region, and therefore about Pakistan’s value as an ally.

Pakistan’s strongest card with the United States is the threat to block the port of Karachi. But here, too, there is a counter to Pakistan: If Pakistan closes Karachi to American shipping, either the Indian or American navy also could close it to Pakistani shipping. Karachi is Pakistan’s main export facility, and Pakistan is heavily dependent on it. If Karachi were blocked, particularly while Pakistan is undergoing a massive financial crisis, Pakistan would face disaster. Karachi is thus a double-edged sword. As long as Pakistan keeps it open to the Americans, India probably won’t block it. But should Pakistan ever close the port in response to U.S. action in the Afghan-Pakistani borderland, then Pakistan should not assume that the port will be available for its own use.

India’s Military Challenge

India faces difficulties in all of its military options. Attacks on training camps sound more effective than they are. Concentrating troops on the border is impressive only if India is prepared for a massive land war, and a naval blockade has multiple complications.

India needs a military option that demonstrates will and capability and decisively hurts the Pakistani government, all without drawing India into a nuclear exchange or costly ground war. And its response must rise above the symbolic.

We have no idea what India is thinking, but one obvious option is airstrikes directed not against training camps, but against key government installations in Islamabad. The Indian air force increasingly has been regarded as professional and capable by American pilots at Red Flag exercises in Nevada. India has modern Russian fighter jets and probably has the capability, with some losses, to penetrate deep into Pakistani territory.

India also has acquired radar and electronic warfare equipment from Israel and might have obtained some early precision-guided munitions from Russia and/or Israel. While this capability is nascent, untested and very limited, it is nonetheless likely to exist in some form.

The Indians might opt for a drawn-out diplomatic process under the theory that all military action is either ineffective or excessively risky. If it chooses the military route, New Delhi could opt for a buildup of ground troops and some limited artillery exchanges and tactical ground attacks. It also could choose airstrikes against training facilities. Each of these military options would achieve the goal of some substantial action, but none would threaten fundamental Pakistani interests. The naval blockade has complexities that could not be managed. That leaves, as a possible scenario, a significant escalation by India against targets in Pakistan’s capital.

The Indians have made it clear that the ISI is their enemy. The ISI has a building, and buildings can be destroyed, along with files and personnel. Such an aerial attack also would serve to shock the Pakistanis by representing a serious escalation. And Pakistan might find retaliation difficult, given the relative strength of its air force. India has few good choices for retaliation, and while this option is not a likely one, it is undoubtedly one that has to be considered.

It seems to us that India can avoid attacks on Pakistan only if Islamabad makes political concessions that it would find difficult to make. The cost to Pakistan of these concessions might well be greater than the benefit of avoiding conflict with India. All of India’s options are either ineffective or dangerous, but inactivity is politically and strategically the least satisfactory route for New Delhi. This circumstance is the most dangerous aspect of the current situation. In our opinion, the relative quiet at present should not be confused with the final outcome, unless Pakistan makes surprising concessions.

Inexpensive Bottles to Help Keep You Afloat

By Jason Wilson
Wednesday, October 29, 2008; F05

Hey, have you heard the one about the failing economy? As we sink further toward a recession, people probably will be drinking more. It's not just a cliche, it's fact: Historically, sales of alcoholic beverages grow during recessions. And not just the cheap stuff. In a recent survey conducted by Zagat and liquor giant Diageo, 58 percent of Americans said they would be willing to pay more to have a cocktail made with premium, "top-shelf" brands, even during an economic downturn.

That may be true, but one thing I have learned through writing this column is that no one agrees on exactly what top-shelf means. For some it means $100 cognac or Calvados; for others it's $35 craft-distilled gins. Some envision obscure European liqueurs; some, $40 flavored vodkas. For others it means anything except what they swilled when they were young and broke.

"I've decided I'm just going to start drinking the same stuff I drank in college," an old friend told me a few weeks ago.

That friend has never had good taste in booze, so I asked, "Does that mean you'll be drinking Zima again?" Little did I know that would prove impossible. Last week, MillerCoors, the geniuses who tried to persuade Gen-Xers to drink Zima in the early 1990s, announced that it was, at long last, discontinuing sales of the much-maligned "malternative." A moment of silence, please.

Okay, seriously: I believe one can drink frugally without resorting to a "malternative" or other such nonsense. I'm sure many will continue to invest in top-shelf liquors (which might be a shrewder bet right now than the stock market). But I can't imagine that, during tough times, many people will be shelling out for such specialties as $35 cachaca, $50 10-times-distilled vodkas or $60 absinthe (of which there are now a half-dozen on the market).

In the past, when I've given advice on stocking the bar, I've generally set $20 to $25 as the standard for "value," that elusive mix of quality and affordability. But my friend who's closest to college age (at 25) told me that, for her, $20 was "very top shelf" and $15 "still feels like a splurge." I think a lot of people feel that way. And a lot more soon will.

I still believe, though, that there are certain costs you have to suck up: You need to keep vermouth and bitters on hand. Cointreau will cost you about $39, but it's the one nonnegotiable mixer. I'd still stick with Tanqueray or Plymouth gins ($20 to $25), though you could consider switching to Beefeater's ($17). But there are some spirits that, if finances are tight, you might have to go without. Finding a good 100 percent agave tequila under $25 is nearly impossible; ditto for single-malt scotch and cognac.

There are alternatives. In an emergency, you could replace your usual margarita with a caipirinha, using a basic, low-cost cachaca such as Pitu ($13). Or switch to a pisco sour, because most piscos retail for $16 to $18. Or just stick with rum: You can pick up a bottle of four-year-old Flor de Caña Gold rum for about $13. If Stolichnaya vodka is too pricey at $18, you could survive with Svedka at $12.

When it comes to scotch, you'll have to switch to blended, but you could do worse than White Horse ($17). As spirits critic F. Paul Pacult writes in his new book, "Kindred Spirits 2," "All the world's dictionaries should place a photo of a White Horse bottle next to the words 'Blended Scotch Whiskey.' " As for brandy, switch from cognac to more underrated Spanish brandies, such as Osborne Veterano, Torres 5-year-old, or Fundador Solera Reserve (all about $15).

H. Joseph Ehrmann, owner of Elixir in San Francisco, offers some excellent tips to economize on spirits:

· Buy American. The weak dollar drives up the prices of imported spirits.

· Avoid new and trendy products. "They price higher right out of the gate. Everyone wants to be 'the next Grey Goose.' You pay for what is fashionable."

· Don't be afraid to order what your dad used to drink. Old brands usually are still around because they are good.

Keeping that advice in mind, I am recommending that my readers invest heavily in good old Kentucky bourbon and domestic rye whiskey in the coming quarter. As Pacult told the Associated Press a few months ago, these American whiskeys remain "the best bargains in spirits."

My favorite bargain whiskeys? I like both Old Overholt and Rittenhouse Rye (both $14) and even Wild Turkey Rye (about $18). They are great for a Manhattan, old fashioned, Vieux Carre or Sazerac. For bourbon, cheap, hard-to-beat options include Evan Williams ($11) and Ancient Age ($10). But even a good-quality bourbon like Maker's Mark is still only $22, and I know plenty of people who consider Maker's Mark to be pretty close to "top-shelf."

Let's all just raise a glass in hopes that all of the shelves -- top, middle and bottom -- don't coming crashing to the floor.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/28/AR2008102800903_pf.html

July 17, 2008
Our Towns
Moving Too Fast to Drive 55
By PETER APPLEBOME

PLATTEKILL, N.Y.

At the Plattekill travel plaza of the New York State Thruway on Wednesday, you didn’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind was blowing on gas prices and on the economy over all.

Forget the $4.27 per gallon for regular at the pumps. Inside, every flat-screen television seemed to feature one scary message or another for people to ponder over their Starbucks lattes or Roy Rogers burgers.

“America’s Fuel Crisis,” read the headline on CNN as various talking heads were summoned to debate drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. “What I’ll Never Give Up,” was the topic on Headline News as callers were asked what they could not do without (favorite guitar and amp was one reply) no matter how far under water their finances might sink.

So you might have thought an idea that could cut people’s gasoline costs by 15 percent or more as soon as they pulled out of the lot might have some appeal. It’s a Golden Oldie from the 1970s that was resuscitated this month when Senator John Warner, Republican of Virginia, suggested that Congress might want to consider returning to a national speed limit to save gasoline and possibly ease fuel prices.

Mr. Warner did not call for a return to 55 miles per hour, the limit set by Congress in 1974 in reaction to the energy shocks of another generation. But he asked the Energy Department to determine the most fuel-efficient speed limit, noting that Americans had saved 167,000 barrels of petroleum a day when the 55-mile limit was in effect. (Congress repealed the measure in 1995.) The experts say that fuel efficiency deteriorates radically at speeds above 60 miles per hour. Every 5 miles over that threshold is estimated to cost drivers, Mr. Warner said in his letter, “essentially an additional 30 cents per gallon in fuel costs.”

So slowing down from 65 or 70 miles per hour to 55 or 60 might seem a no-brainer — free money! — for drivers reeling from high gas prices. But though the rational brain might say yes, the reptile brain, the metabolic modern brain, the highway-driver brain, seems to say, let’s look for savings another way.

“It’s unrealistic,” said Darren Jacobs, an engineer from Grantham, N.H., who was driving home from Macungie, Pa. That is a trip of 412 miles, or 6 hours and 47 minutes, according to MapQuest. So assuming 25 miles per gallon, driving at 55 would likely cost 40 minutes and save at least $7. He figured he’d spend the money.

“It’s too slow,” Mr. Jacobs said. “It’s not the way we live. Everything is fast. We eat fast food. We have high-speed Internet. If you’re going from Point A to Point B you want to get there as soon as you can. I don’t think the solution is making us go slower. It’s getting tough on the greedy people who are profiting from this.”

Pete Boucheron, a retiree from Schenectady, N.Y., said, yeah, there’s some logic to 55, but it might have more appeal if prices got really high, say $6 or $7 a gallon. Gustavo Cardenas said he was for it — but then, he’s from Montreal.

Environmental groups say 55 is a good idea and as there’s an Internet presence for everything, groups like the Drive 55 Conservation Project, (www.drive55.org) are ready to go.

On the other hand, given red-state fury over the mere thought of a return to 55, don’t bet on a new law. As Sammy Hagar’s “I Can’t Drive 55” put it: “Write me up for 125/Post my face, wanted dead or alive/Take my license, all that jive/I can’t drive 55!”

In fact, there are various ideas out there to cope with the crushing increase in gas prices; one is for governments to be open four days a week, for longer hours, instead of five. But maybe Phil Gramm wasn’t entirely wrong. Maybe we are happier whining about problems rather than coming up with solutions that entail any sort of inconvenience.

As for 55 — law or not, no one’s stopping you. A retro drive toward the Catskills on Wednesday, with Chopin (way above my customary cultural pay grade) playing on the radio, had its pleasures. Crossing the Tappan Zee at 55, I was pretty much in the traffic flow, but before long I was being passed by everyone except one guy in a Nissan Maxima with handicap plates. It was not too bad on 287, but quite a bit more harried on the Thruway, which was two lanes, populated by many big trucks and S.U.V.’s probably not listening to Chopin.

I would not have been averse to a similar trip home, but like Mr. Jacobs, I had a deadline, and 55 seemed a luxury I couldn’t afford. I tuned the radio to oldies rock on WCBS, and a little pokily, but more or less in the traffic flow, set the cruise control to 65.

Update: Alas, the saga of the Wiffle ball kids of Greenwich, Conn., seems to have come to a lawyerly, if not entirely happy ending. After a group of players, parents and town officials met for two hours on Wednesday, First Selectman Peter Tesei said that the field youngsters built in May in an empty lot owned by the town would have to come down by Friday because it raised unacceptable liability issues. The town plans to help them build another field at a nearby school. “I think they could have let us play a few more weeks,” said Vincent Provenzano, one of the organizers. Then he excused himself, saying he was in the middle of a game.

E-mail: peappl@nytimes.com

Veteran manager Eveillard blames Greenspan, sees bargains in Asia

Mutual Understanding Veteran manager Eveillard blames Greenspan, sees bargains in Asia Last Update: 1:53 PM ET Jun 26, 2008 Mutual-fund manager Jean-Marie Eveillard is a veteran buyer of value stocks, and when he surveys the global investment landscape nowadays, years of experience make him a cautious shopper. ...Read the rest of the story

Most E-mailed Gas could fall to $2 if Congress acts, analysts say Veteran manager Eveillard blames Greenspan, sees bargains in Asia CORRECT: U.S. stocks plunge; worst June for Dow since 1930 Sour on brokers, Goldman puts Citigroup on conviction sell list Oil scores record gains as Fed decision weighs on dollar Do your dependents qualify for coverage? Employers want to know Pimco's El-Erian sees high inflation, waning U.S. economic power Sprint Nextel shows good Instinct Existing-home sales rise 2% in May UBS fraud charges latest in auction-rate securities saga

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Gas could fall to $2 if Congress acts, analysts say
Limiting speculation would push prices to fundamental level, lawmakers told
By Rex Nutting & Michael Kitchen, MarketWatch
Last update: 2:15 p.m. EDT June 23, 2008

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) -- The price of retail gasoline could fall by half, to around $2 a gallon, within 30 days of passage of a law to limit speculation in energy-futures markets, four energy analysts told Congress on Monday.
Testifying to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Michael Masters of Masters Capital Management said that the price of oil would quickly drop closer to its marginal cost of around $65 to $75 a barrel, about half the current $135.
Fadel Gheit of Oppenheimer & Co., Edward Krapels of Energy Security Analysis and Roger Diwan of PFC Energy Consultants agreed with Masters' assessment at a hearing on proposed legislation to limit speculation in futures markets.
Krapels said that it wouldn't even take 30 days to drive prices lower, as fund managers quickly liquidated their positions in futures markets.
"Record oil prices are inflated by speculation and not justified by market fundamentals," according to Gheit. "Based on supply and demand fundamentals, crude-oil prices should not be above $60 per barrel."
"Energy speculation has become a growth industry and it is time for the government to intervene," said Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., chairman of the full committee. "We need to consider a full range of options to counter this rapacious speculation."
Dingell introduced a bill on June 11 that would ask the Energy Department to gather the facts on energy prices, including the role played by speculators. See full story.
There are two kinds of speculators in the futures markets, Masters said. Traditional speculators are those who need to hedge because they actually take physical possession of the commodities. Index speculators, on the other hand, are merely allocating a portion of their portfolio to commodity futures.
Index speculation damages price-discovery mechanisms provided by futures markets provide, Masters added
The committee will likely consider legislation that would rein in index speculation by imposing higher-margin requirements; setting position limits for speculators; requiring more disclosure of positions; and preventing pension funds and investment banks from owning commodities.
Both major presidential candidates have supported closing loopholes that encourage speculation in the energy markets. Read more on Election Blog.
However, other witnesses said that pure speculators have had little impact on energy prices, which have doubled in the past year to about $135 per barrel. Both Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman have dismissed the impact of speculators on prices paid by consumers.
Speculators now account for about 70% of all benchmark crude trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange, up from 37% in 2000, said Rep. Bart Stupak, D-Mich., chairman of the investigations subcommittee. Stupak introduced a bill on Friday that would limit index speculation.
There has been much discussion recently about how big a role speculators have been playing in the sharp rise in energy prices, though no consensus has emerged on this point.
Congress, however, has grown increasingly concerned over speculative investors' role in the energy market in comparison with those buying futures contracts to hedge against risk from price changes. Lawmakers are expected to consider legislation to set strict limits -- or in some cases, an outright ban -- on speculative trading in energy futures in some markets.
Dingell is looking into any legal loopholes that may have contributed to speculation in energy markets. In 1991, according to documents provided by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to the committee's investigators, the agency authorized the first exemption from position limits for swap dealers with no physical commodity exposure. This began what Dingell said was "a process that has enabled investment banks to accumulate enormous positions in commodity markets."
In a letter to the CFTC last week, Dingell asked the agency to disclose how many other exemptions it has provided over the years. End of Story
Rex Nutting is Washington bureau chief of MarketWatch.
Michael Kitchen is a copy editor for MarketWatch and is based in New York.

December 4, 2007
Observatory
Chimps Exhibit Superior Memory, Outshining Humans
By HENRY FOUNTAIN

Spend even a little time around chimpanzees, and you begin to realize how intelligent they are. But can they outshine humans in brain power? Most humans would scoff at that.

But researchers have shown that young chimps outperform adult humans in a memory test, a Concentration-like game using numerals on a computer screen.

“We were very surprised to find this,” Tetsuro Matsuzawa of the Primate Research Institute at Kyoto University said. “But it’s a very concrete, simple fact. Young chimps are superior to human adults in a memory task.”

Dr. Matsuzawa and a colleague, Sana Inoue, first trained chimps to recognize the numerals 1 through 9 in sequence. Ai, the first chimp trained, an adult female was found with a memory capability equal to that of adult humans.

When the researchers went to see if there was a difference with chimps younger than 6, the animals had a touch screen where scattered numerals appeared for up to two-thirds of a second and were then masked by white squares. With the shortest exposure time, about a fifth of a second, the chimps had an 80 percent accuracy rate, compared with adult humans’ 40 percent. The findings are described in Current Biology.

Dr. Matsuzawa said the ability reminded him of the phenomenon called eidetic imagery, in which a person memorizes details of a complex scene at a glance. This so-called photographic memory is present in a very small number of children, and is often associated with autism.

Dr. Matsuzawa speculated that perhaps somewhere back in common evolution, humans and chimps had this ability. But humans lost it because they gained something else, communicating through a complex language.

As Ai demonstrates, adult chimps lose the ability, too. Dr. Matsuzawa suggested that as the chimps age, their memory capability is otherwise occupied.